

THE GERMAN-ISRAELI DEFENSE COOPERATION

Author: Karl Licht
As of: December 2025

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- German-Israeli cooperation in the defense and armaments sector dates back to the 1950s. The cooperative industrial structures established at that time still exist today.
- This cooperation continuously expanded in both directions over the past 25 years, extending to the military domains land, sea, air and cyberspace.
- From 2020 to 2024, Germany ranked as the second-largest supplier of military equipment to Israel, with a 33% share of the total amount. At the same time, Israel was the second most important supplier to Germany accounting for 13 percent of major arms imports.
- The relationship between the leading arms exporting countries is characterized by the exploitation of synergies resulting from Germany's broad industrial base on the one hand and the innovative strength and operational deployment of Israeli technology on the other.
- New geopolitical trends—in particular the rise of the Russia–Iran axis—create similar capability requirements in the Middle East and on NATO's eastern flank.
- For Germany, deeper cooperation makes it possible to close critical capability gaps in key areas (e.g., air defense and cyber resilience) more quickly and reliably.
- For Israel, expanded cooperation strengthens deterrence and endurance vis-à-vis Iran and its proxies.

In 2025, the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment of official diplomatic relations. However, defense cooperation between the two countries reaches back a decade further. What initially began as strictly confidential cooperation gave way in the 1990s to an open partnership, which steadily deepened and is more diverse than ever today.

Alongside Germany's historic responsibility toward Israel, the logic of the Cold War long shaped the relationship. A pattern emerged: Israel received urgently needed military materiel from German stocks in order to withstand its adversaries. In return, Germany benefited from Israel's intelligence insights into the quality of Soviet weapons systems that were employed by numerous Arab states. These fed directly into the development of German defense technology and were intended to make a decisive difference in the event of a confrontation with the Warsaw Pact in Europe. One example is the increase in firepower of the Leopard 2 main battle tank in the 1970s through the adoption of a 120-mm cannon, based on an analysis of the armor of a Soviet-made T-64 captured by Israel.¹

From the 1980s onward the growing innovative strength of Israel's defense industry made cooperation in the development of new complex systems increasingly attrac-

tive for the Federal Republic. Under the codename Cerberus, defense companies and intelligence services of both countries worked together to develop a superior electronic jamming and deception system to protect the Tornado multirole combat aircraft.²

The 1990s marked a turning point in the relationship between the two countries: previously quiet cooperation became more visible. The catalyst for this was the First Gulf War. The threat to Israel from Iraqi Scud ballistic missiles reinforced its desire for modern naval capabilities in order to build an additional, flexible deterrence and defense potential. Driven by the scandal that the Scud missiles contained German guidance components, the Federal Republic agreed to finance Dolphin-class submarines built in Kiel. The commissioning of the submarines in 1999 and 2000 demonstrated that both countries were capable of jointly implementing sensitive projects. At the same time, it marked the starting point of the intensive relation we know today.³

Especially in times of geopolitical upheaval, this deep and multifaceted relationship holds great potential. To understand how it can be harnessed, it is essential to take a close look at the starting point of both countries' defense industries as well as the evolution of the fields of cooperation.

The German Defense Industry

The German defense industry is among the most significant in the world. It benefits from advanced engineering, a robust industrial base, and close cooperation within NATO. Like the German economy as a whole, the defense sector is characterized by a symbiosis of large industrial corporations and a wide range of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In 2024, it generated revenues of EUR 31 billion – with an upward trend.⁴ The main areas of German defense production include naval technology (e.g., TKMS), combat vehicles and artillery (e.g., FFG, Rheinmetall, and KNDS), propulsion and transmission systems (e.g., Rolls-Royce Power Systems and RENK), air defense, sensors and optronics (e.g., Diehl, Hensoldt, Zeiss), as well as the production of munitions (e.g., the Nitrochemie Group).⁵

According to figures from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWE), the sector employs around 105,000 people. Estimates by the German Security and Defense Industry Association (BDSV) suggest that more than 500,000 jobs in Germany are indirectly linked to the industry.⁶

As shown by figures of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Germany ranked fifth among the world's largest exporters of weapons systems between 2020 and 2024, with a global market share of 5.6 percent.⁷ In 2024, the federal government approved exports worth EUR 13.2 billion – a new record high and an increase of around one billion compared to the previous year. Nearly two-thirds of the approved exports in 2024 were directed toward supporting Ukraine in its defense struggle.⁸

One of the great strengths of the German defense sector lies in its broad industrial base, which is founded on modular systems and NATO standards, dense regional defense clusters, European consortia (Airbus, MBDA, KNDS), and skilled workers, among other things.⁹ German weapon systems, such as the Leopard 2 main battle tank, form the backbone of the armed forces not only in the Bundeswehr, but also in other NATO allies.¹⁰ Thus the German defense industry has a key role to play in achieving the ambitious NATO capability targets that were agreed in The Hague in June 2025.¹¹

The German defense industry is shaped by a number of dynamics. A central driver is the threat to the European security architecture posed by Russia. The result has been a refocusing away from foreign deployments toward traditional national and collective defense (LV/BV). In addition, growing skepticism about the reliability of transatlantic relations has led to stronger calls for strategic sovereignty in Europe.

These reversals are underpinned by new defense investments. Following the EUR 100 billion special fund from the last legislative period, the new federal government under Chancellor Friedrich Merz has committed to additional defense spending in the billions, signaling a departure from decades of restraint in security policy.¹²

The Israeli Defense Industry

Ranked eighth, Israel, like Germany, is among the top ten largest arms exporters worldwide. In the years 2020-2024, Israeli companies had a market share of approximately 3.1 percent.¹³ In 2024, exports reached a new record high of approximately USD 14.7 billion. Compared to the previous year, the volume increased by approximately 13 percent. According to estimates by the Israeli Ministry of Defense, the total is expected to grow to approximately USD 18 billion in the year 2025. Air defense systems and missiles accounted for the largest share (48 percent), followed by vehicles and armored personnel carriers (9 percent). Space systems, radar systems, and systems for electronic warfare shared third place with 8 percent each.¹⁴


The figures illustrate a characteristic feature of the Israeli defense industry—its strong export orientation. Unlike other leading arms manufacturers, which focus on their domestic markets, Israel exports around 85 percent of its arms abroad.¹⁵ More than half of the total exports (54 percent) are shipped to Europe. Asia and the Indo-Pacific region ranked second (23 percent).

Around 12 percent of exports went to signatory countries of the Abraham Accords – Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates.¹⁶ The Iranian threat is perceived not only by Israel, but also by numerous Arab states, promoting the trend toward the acquisition of Israeli weapons systems.¹⁷

Compared to the economy as a whole, the defense industry in Germany is small. The opposite is the case in Israel. The country, which otherwise has little industrial capacity and a population of just under 10 million, is home to three of the 100 largest defense companies in the world—Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Elbit Systems, and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems.¹⁸

A key strength of the Israeli defense industry lies in its high level of innovation, which is a fundamental component of Israel's defense doctrine. As early as the 1950s, Israel's first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion, stated that technological superiority was essential in response to Israel's quantitative inferiority to its military adversaries.¹⁹ The fact that this principle continues to apply today is demonstrated by Israel's pioneering role in future technologies such as electronic warfare (EW), the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the application of artificial intelligence (AI) in the field of defense.

Israeli Defense Exports by Region 2024



An important foundation for this is the uniquely close civil-military cooperation, which is embedded in a network of excellent universities and a dynamic start-up landscape.²⁰ The awareness deeply rooted in Israeli society of the state's original task of ensuring public safety also offers additional value for closer cooperation in context of Germany's "Zeitenwende" ("watershed moment").

In addition, the regional threat situation and the associated military conflicts lead to continuous operational testing of defense technologies. This opens up the possibility of iterative improvement of one's own systems and demonstration

of capabilities. A clear example of this is the penetration and destruction of Iran's air defense capabilities during the Israel-Iran war in June 2025. Battle-tested Israeli products are available at short notice and can be procured "off the shelf" without long development or adaptation phases, which is a considerable advantage.²¹

German-Israeli Cooperation

Due to its unique geographical and demographic situation, the State of Israel is dependent on defense solutions that take these conditions into account. In this light, cooperation with German specialists has developed over decades and is difficult to replace. As a result, the country, which has limited industrial capacity, is reliant on German production lines to maintain its operational readiness and thus its continuous deterrence capability against external threats.²²

According to SIPRI, Germany was the second most important supplier of major arms to Israel between 2020 and 2024, accounting for 33 percent of the total. At the same time, Israel was the second most important supplier to Germany during this period, accounting for 13 percent of major arms imports – in both cases behind the US. Legal frameworks such as the War Weapons Control Act and the Political Principles of the Federal Government make Germany a restrictive arms exporter, especially to crisis regions or states outside the EU and NATO. Nevertheless, the Middle East accounted for around 37 percent of exports between 2020 and 2024.²³

Developments in the region since the terrorist attack by Hamas on October 7, 2023, have had a significant impact on exports to Israel. Initially, German arms exports rose sharply. In 2023 as a whole, they amounted to approximately EUR 327 million and thus increased tenfold compared to 2022. Between October 2023

and May 2025, approved arms exports totaled EUR 485 million. The volume declined significantly in the course of 2024. The debate over Chancellor Merz's August 2025 decision to halt arms exports that could potentially be used in the Gaza Strip exemplifies this development.²⁴

Even beyond arms cooperation, German-Israeli security cooperation is strong, as demonstrated by regular joint exercises – such as the 2020 "Blue Wings" air force exercise marking the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz – and the participation of Israeli officers in programs at the German Armed Forces Command and Staff College. Beyond bilateral cooperation, both sides also collaborate in an international context. One example of this cooperation is the partnership between NATO and Israel within the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). The cooperation focuses on the areas of maritime security, counterterrorism, and civil protection.²⁶

Info

#2

Between 2020 and 2024, Germany was the second most important supplier of defense systems to Israel (33%).*

During the same period, Israel was the second most important supplier of defense systems to Germany (13%).*

*in both cases after the USA.

Unaffected by day-to-day political debates, the German-Israeli partnership now extends across all military domains – land, sea, air, and cyber.

At Sea

Following the commissioning of the first Dolphin-class submarines in 1999 and 2000, Israel and Germany

consolidated their cooperation in the maritime sector. In the mid-2000s, contracts were signed for a second batch of submarines with improved range and air-independent propulsion (AIP). The latest submarine of the continuously modernized Dolphin II class, the INS Drakon, was christened in November 2024. Back in January 2022, the contract was signed for a new, larger, and more powerful third generation of the Dakar class, which, like its predecessors, will be built by Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and is scheduled to enter service with the Israeli Navy in 2031.²⁷ The submarines, which are specially adapted to Israel's needs, are central to the country's ability to launch a second strike in the event of a nuclear attack and thus to its nuclear deterrence.²⁸

Cooperation in the field of surface systems has also continued to develop. The latest Israeli corvettes of the Sa'ar 6 class, equipped with stealth technology, were designed by TKMS and launched at German Naval Yards in Kiel. In December 2023, the INS Nitzachon, the last ship in the series, was commissioned by the Israeli Navy.²⁹

On Land

Cooperation in the land domain intensified as early as the mid-2000s. One example of this is the collaboration on the development of anti-tank capabilities. In 2004, EuroSpike was formed as a joint venture between Rafael, Diehl Defence, and Rheinmetall with the aim of producing the proven Israeli Spike guided missile system in Germany and integrating it into the German Armed Forces. The Bundeswehr integrated the continuously improved weapons system under the designation MELLs into the Puma infantry fighting vehicle. However, the system can also be used by dismounted soldiers. In October 2025, it became known that Germany, through the NATO procurement agency, agreed to purchase additional EuroSpike missiles worth about EUR 2 billion.³⁰

Driven by observations from the Russo-Ukrainian war, companies from both countries are also collaborating on active protection systems designed to defend against anti-tank weapons. The Israeli Trophy system is being rolled out as part of the modernization of the Leopard 2 A7A1. On the other hand, the most advanced Israeli Merkava IV battle tanks use German technology, such as the special gearboxes from the Augsburg-based manufacturer RENK, which have been produced continuously for Israel for over 40 years.³¹

In the field of vehicle construction, the Flensburger Fahrzeugbau Gesellschaft (FFG) and Israeli company ELTA are also cooperating. The aim is to combine autonomous capabilities, AI, and

robotics with innovative protection solutions in the construction of armored vehicles.³²

Based on experiences from the war in Ukraine, German and Israeli partners (KNDS and Elbit) are joining forces and driving forward the development of capabilities in the field of artillery. With EuroPULS – the European variant of the Israeli PULS – the German Armed Forces will replace the MARS II rocket artillery systems (MLRS) delivered to Kyiv. The system is also used by Denmark and the Netherlands and is an example of how Israeli technology can contribute to improving interoperability among NATO partners.³³

Rheinmetall and Elbit are also collaborating on the development of the highly mobile L-52 155 mm wheeled howitzer.³⁴ In the field of high-precision loitering munitions, which are becoming increasingly relevant on the modern battlefield, MBDA and IAI are cooperating.³⁵


In the Air

With the leasing of Israeli Heron 1 drones in 2010, the German Armed Forces had access to a medium-altitude long-endurance drone (MALE UAV) for the first time. With the ability to remain in the air for over 24 hours and transmit images in real time, dangers to soldiers on foreign missions in Afghanistan and Mali could be detected early on.³⁶

Sa'ar-6-Class Corvette
Image: ELNET



German-Israeli Defense Cooperation



Source: Handelsblatt and own research

Germany is also using Israeli technology for the successor to the Heron 1. With the German Heron TP, the German Armed Forces now have their first MALE UAV system capable of carrying weapons.³⁷ The flight training of German Armed Forces crews takes place under the name "Red Baron" at the Israeli air base Tel Nof. After a brief interruption due to the Hamas-Israel war, it has been continuing intensively since April 2025.³⁸ Originally, the primary reason for procurement was the use in Bundeswehr missions abroad.

However, the system is also becoming increasingly important for national and alliance defense, e.g., in the monitoring of critical infrastructure (KRITIS). It is currently integrated into the NATO operation Baltic Sentry for the monitoring of underwater data cables.³⁹

In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Russia relies on cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and UAVs, among other weapons. Defending against these threats requires multi-layered air defense capabilities, which 23 European countries have now joined forces to develop as part of the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI). Germany contributes to this effort by procuring the Israeli Arrow 3 system, which enables the defense against missiles with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers.⁴⁰ In December 2023, the procurement contract was signed – with a volume of EUR 3.5 billion, a new record for Israeli arms exports. In December 2025 Germany declared the initial operational capability (IOC) of Arrow 3.⁴¹



Heron TP of the German Armed Forces
Image: Bundeswehr/Ann-Kathrin Steinbring (via Flickr)

The German government is currently discussing cooperation on Arrow 4, whose development is still in its infancy. The latest model in the Arrow family is expected to be more effective against maneuverable Russian hypersonic missiles in the future.⁴²

The German Air Force's main platforms also rely on Israeli technology. For example, the Luftwaffe's Eurofighters are equipped with Israeli Litening 5 targeting systems, and German A400M transport aircraft and government aircraft are equipped with the J-MUSIC laser defense system.⁴³

In Space

As the level of collaboration in this area is currently low, cooperation with Israel in the field of space offers great potential. Since the launch of its first reconnaissance satellite, Ofek-1, in 1988, Israel became one of the leading nations in the field of sophisticated, space-based defense, reconnaissance, and early warning systems.⁴⁴

The EU made the development of such systems a priority as part of its 2023 EU Space Strategy for Security and Defense. Structured dialogue and the integration of Israeli partners in EU space projects could help to close capability gaps more quickly and reliably.⁴⁵ On the other hand, the Israel Space Agency (ISA) is pushing ahead with a growth initiative that aims to quadruple the country's space industry revenue to USD 4 billion in the coming years, partly through international partnerships.⁴⁶ Since 2021, German and Israeli experts have been discussing the nexus between space and defense policy as part of the German Israeli Space Forum initiated by ELNET and the Federation of German Industries (BDI).⁴⁷

In Cyberspace

In May 2025, German Minister of the Interior Alexander Dobrindt announced plans for closer cooperation with Israel on cyber defense under the heading "Cyber Dome." The aim is to establish a

center for German-Israeli cyber research to expand capabilities in the detection and defense against espionage activities and the protection of KRITIS.⁴⁸ Building capabilities in the cyber domain is particularly important for Germany, which assumes the role of logistical hub for the defense of the alliance in the event of a conflict with Russia.

AI-based data processing, which plays an increasingly important role in all domains, is one of the strengths of Israeli industry.⁴⁹ An example of cooperation in this area is the collaboration between Hensoldt and Rafael on the KALÆTRON Attack System. The jamming system, which uses AI and has already been integrated into the Eurofighter jet, will also be used to protect naval vessels.⁵⁰

Outlook

The coalition agreement of the current German government declares the promotion of future technologies in the defense sector to be a central goal. These include satellite systems, AI, and UAVs—areas in which Israel is a leader.⁵¹ Accordingly, existing cooperation could be deepened. Specialized German-Israeli defense tech hubs

“

The security and defense cooperation between Germany and Israel demonstrates an exceptional degree of trust, friendship, and mutual reliability.

Federal Minister of Defence
Boris Pistorius MP
(29 March 2023)

”

could make relevant contributions as bilateral innovation centers to create a technology corridor.⁵²

For the Jewish state, on the other hand, cooperation on naval systems and access to suppliers of armored vehicles from Germany will continue to be an important basis for maintaining and strengthening its deterrence capabilities in a region that is partly hostile. Geopolitical developments—above all the Russia-Iran axis—are leading to similar capability requirements emerging in the Middle East and on NATO’s eastern flank. One example of this is the use of Iranian Shahed 136 kamikaze drones and their Russian successor, the Geran 2, in the Russo-Ukrainian war. At the same time, Iran is resorting to modern Russian weapon systems. With Iran’s first test of the Russian S-400 air defense system in July 2025, Israel now faces similar challenges in securing air superiority as NATO.⁵³

Discussions held at EU level to exclude Israel from Horizon Europe, and specifically Israeli start-ups from EU programs

such as the EIC Accelerator, run the risk of blocking European access to Israel’s innovative strength.

In light of European efforts to become more independent from the US, Europe and Germany are in danger of losing touch with future technologies in the defense sector.⁵⁴ Instead, Germany and Israel should jointly consider how they can support start-ups from both countries with venture capital, expertise, and market access in the defense sector, for example through a binational defense tech fund.⁵⁵

In addition, expanding knowledge exchange between the armed forces of both countries—for example, by establishing a joint defense academy for technology and innovation—could help better prepare military and technical personnel for the security challenges of the future.⁵⁶

Info

THE ELNET SECURITY & DEFENSE INITIATIVE ESDI

Security policy cooperation between Germany and Israel has a long history. The ELNET Security & Defense Initiative (ESDI) was launched in July 2025 to explore new avenues of cooperation in the face of global threats and technological upheaval. The initiative aims to deepen strategic dialogue, tap into joint innovation potential, and place the German-Israeli partnership on a sustainable, structurally sound footing.

European Leadership Network (ELNET)

ESDI | ELNET
SECURITY & DEFENSE
INITIATIVE



MORE
INFORMATION
ON THE ESDI



Image: ELNET / Tobias Koch

REFERENCES

- Serr, Marcel: "Zur Geschichte der deutsch-israelischen Rüstungskoope-ration – Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ)", 30.01.2015, in <https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/199900/zur-geschichte-der-deutsch-israelischen-ruestungskoope-ration/>.
- Shapiro, Shlomo: "Cold War Radar Intelligence: Operation 'Cerberus'", in: Journal of Intelligence History, Volume 6, Issue 2 (2006); <https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2006.10555132>.
- Serr, Marcel: "Zur Geschichte der deutsch-israelischen Rüstungskoope-ration – Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ)", 30.01.2015, in <https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/199900/zur-geschichte-der-deutsch-israelischen-ruestungskoope-ration/>.
- Swaney, Brett: "The German Defense-Industrial Zeitenwende: Implications for Transatlantic Security – INSS Strategic Perspectives, 43.", 05.2025, <https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=inss-strategic-perspectives>.
- Ibid.
- Der Spiegel: "Zahl der Beschäftigten in der Rüstungsindustrie steigt deutlich", 05.06.2025, in <https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/ruestungsindustrie-in-deutschland-zahl-der-beschaeftigten-deutlich-gestiegen-a-d4973a52-9200-44f7-a894-6647c8ea0db3>.
- George, Matthew; Djokic, Katarina; Hussain, Zain; Wezeman, Pieter; Wezeman, Siemon: "Trends in International Arms Transfers", 2024 – Sipri Fact Sheet, 03.2025, in https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf.
- Tagesschau: "Deutsche Rüstungsexporte erreichen Rekord", 18.12.2024, in <https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/bilanz-ruestungsexporte-100.html>.
- Swaney, Brett: "The German Defense-Industrial Zeitenwende: Implications for Transatlantic Security – INSS Strategic Perspectives, 43.", 05.2025, in <https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=inss-strategic-perspectives>.
- Gady, Franz-Stefan: "German Defense Companies Could Be Europe's Arsenal of Democracy", 06.07.2023, in <https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/06/germany-bundeswehr-defense-industry-zeitenwende-weapons-arms-exports-rheinmetall-leopard-tanks-drones/>.
- NATO: „The Hague Summit Declaration“, 25.06.2025, in https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_236705.html
- Swaney, Brett: "The German Defense-Industrial Zeitenwende: Implications for Transatlantic Security – INSS Strategic Perspectives, 43.", 05.2025, in <https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=inss-strategic-perspectives>.
- George, Matthew; Djokic, Katarina; Hussain, Zain; Wezeman, Pieter; Wezeman, Siemon: „Trends in International Arms Transfers“, 2024 – Sipri Fact Sheet, 03.2025, in https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf.
- Israel Ministry of Defence: "Israel Sets New Record in Defense Exports": Over \$14.7 Billion in 2024, 04.06.2025, in <https://www.mod.gov.il/en/press-releases/press-room/israel-sets-new-record-in-defense-exports-over-147-billion-in-2024>.
- Evron, Yoram: "Israel's defence industry: adaptation and growth in a changing arms market – Defence Studies", Volume 25, Issue 2 (2025), 14.03.2025, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2025.2472720>.
- Israel Ministry of Defence: "Israel Sets New Record in Defense Exports: Over \$14.7 Billion in 2024", 04.06.2025, in <https://www.mod.gov.il/en/press-releases/press-room/israel-sets-new-record-in-defense-exports-over-147-billion-in-2024>.
- Yossef, Amr: "The Regional Impact of the Abraham Accords", Modern War Institute at Westpoint, 03.2021, in, <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/regional-impact-abraham-accords.pdf>.
- Evron, Yoram: "Israel's defence industry: adaptation and growth in a changing arms market – Defence Studies", Volume 25, Issue 2 (2025), 14.03.2025, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2025.2472720>.
- Ibid.
- Adamsky, Dmitry: "The Israeli Approach to Defense Innovation- Research Brief", 07.05.2018, in <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4t07267h>.
- Atlantic Council: "The big lessons from 12 days of war with Iran", 24.06.2025, in <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/fastthinking/the-big-lessons-from-12-days-of-war-with-iran/>.
- Pitel, Laura; Srisvastava, Mehul: "Defence supplier Renk threatens to sidestep German ban on Israel arms export", 13.08.2025, in https://www.ft.com/content/c5f1de08-8e7d-4703-810c-085c40e9af42?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
- George, Matthew; Djokic, Katarina; Hussain, Zain; Wezeman, Pieter; Wezeman, Siemon: "Trends in International Arms Transfers", 2024 – Sipri Fact Sheet, 03.2025, in https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf.
- Kühne, Christopher: "Debatte um Waffenexporte nach Israel: Was liefert Deutschland?", 01.08.2025, in <https://www.rnd.de/politik/deutsche-waffenexporte-nach-israel-was-wurde-geliefert-2VRX46OG6VCFZND6EEBPVQ7EPI.html>.
- Bundeswehr: "Blue Wings 2020", 18.08.2020, in <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/luftwaffe/team-luftwaffe-auf-uebung/blue-wings-2020>.
- Shapiro, Shlomo: "Die Nato und Israel: Auf dem Weg zu einer engeren Partnerschaft", ELNET Policy Briefings, European Leadership Network (ELNET), 23.06.2023, in <https://elnet-deutschland.de/themen/politik/die-nato-und-israel-auf-dem-weg-zu-einer-engeren-partnerschaft/>.
- Mergener, Hans Uwe: "Die Taufe der INS Drakon – Ein diskretes Ereignis von großer Bedeutung", 13.11.2024, in <https://esut.de/2024/11/meldungen/54733/die-taufe-der-ins-drakon-ein-diskretes-ereignis-von-grosser-bedeutung/>.
- Dachs, Gisela: "Whither the 'Special Relationship'? Israeli-German Relations in the Shadow of October 7 and the War on Iran – Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs", 14.08.2025, in <https://doi.org/10.1080/23739770.2025.2543134>.
- Linneman, Navid: "Israelische Marine: Vierte und letzte Korvette der Sa'ar-6-Klasse in Dienst gestellt", 14.12.2023, in <https://defense-network.com/letzte-korvette-der-saar-6-klasse-in-dienst/>.
- Yaron, Odet: "Germany Is Buying Israeli-made Spike Anti-tank Missiles in 2 Billion Euro Deal", 21.10.2025, in <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/security-aviation/2025-10-21/ty-article/premium/germany-is-buying-israeli-made-spike-anti-tank-missiles-in-two-billion-euro-deal/0000019a-0632-d956-a3bb-06fb7baf0000>.

31. Wolf, Mark Simon: "Deutscher Rüstungskonzern kontert Kanzler wegen Israel – und droht mit Teilumzug", 15.08.2025, in <https://www.fr.de/wirtschaft/deutscher-ruestungskonzern-kontert-kanzler-wegen-israel-und-droht-mit-teilumzug-zr-93882647.html>.
32. Europäische Sicherheit & Technik: "Zusammenarbeit FFG und IAI", 30.11.2023, in <https://esut.de/2023/11/meldungen/45880/zusammenarbeit-ffg-und-iai/>.
33. ELNET: "Israelische Technologie für deutsche Sicherheit", 12.02.2025, in <https://elnet-deutschland.de/themen/israelische-technologie-fuer-deutsche-sicherheit/>.
34. Europäische Sicherheit & Technik: "Rheinmetall und Elbit zeigen Radhaubitze im scharfen Schuss", 16.05.2023, in <https://esut.de/2023/05/meldungen/42055/rheinmetall-und-elbit-systems-zeigen-radhaubitze-im-scharfen-schuss/>.
35. Geiger, Waldemar: "MBDA Deutschland und Israel Aerospace Industries kooperieren bei Loitering Munition", 12.07.2023, in <https://soldat-und-technik.de/2023/07/bewaffnung/35286/mbda-deutschland-und-israel-aerospace-industries-kooperieren-bei-loitering-munition/>.
36. Bundeswehr: "Drohne Heron 1", <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ausruestung-technik-bundeswehr/luftsysteme-bundeswehr/drohne-heron-1>.
37. Carstens, Peter: "Wann bewaffnete Drohnen eingesetzt werden dürfen", 16.01.2025, in <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/bundeswehr-wann-bewaffnete-drohnen-eingesetzt-werden-duerfen-110235555.html>.
38. Hartpunkt: "Bundeswehr hat fliegerische Ausbildung auf Heron TP wieder aufgenommen", 06.06.2025, in <https://www.hartpunkt.de/bundeswehr-hat-fliegerische-ausbildung-auf-heron-tp-wieder-aufgenommen/>.
39. Bundeswehr: "Baltic Sentry – Ostsee Schutz Kritischer Unterwasser-Infrastruktur gegen hybride Angriffe", 09.04.2025, in <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/auftrag/einsaetze/missionen/anerkannte-missionen/nato-baltic-sentry>.
40. Boer, John-William; Neuhaus, Carlo: "Angewandte Zeitenwende: Chancen der Kooperation mit Israel", ELNET Policy Briefings, European Leadership Network (ELNET), 12.09.2023, in <https://elnet-deutschland.de/themen/politik/angewandte-zeitenwende-chancen-der-kooperation-mit-israel/>.
41. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: "Bundeswehr beschafft Arrow-3-Luftverteidigungssystem", 23.11.2023, <https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/bundeswehr-beschafft-arrow-3-luftverteidigungssystem-5709582>.
42. Gebauer, Matthias; Hasse, Marc: "Kann diese neue Waffe Deutschlands Luftverteidigung stärken", 15.05.2025, in https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/technik/arrow-4-kann-diese-neue-rakete-deutschlands-luftverteidigung-staerken-a-d4aa9ae1-cba3-41be-86e5-cc926068bb7f?sara_ref=re-so-wa-sh.
43. Ovens, Carsten: "Europa braucht Israel für die eigenen Verteidigung", 02.09.2025, in <https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/gastbeitraege/gastkommentar-europa-braucht-israel-fuer-die-eigene-verteidigung/100151204.html>.
44. Katz, Yakoov; Bohot, Yahir: "The Weapons Wizards – How Israel Became a High-Tech Military Superpower", New York, 2017, S. 136-137.
45. Krämer, Philip: "Sicherheit im Weltraum - Israel, Europa und die Verteidigung der Demokratie", ELNET Policy Briefings, European Leadership Network (ELNET), 15.09.2025, in <https://elnet-deutschland.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Policy-Briefing-Space-Defense.pdf>.
46. Struminski, Wladimir: "Israels Raumfahrtindustrie will hoch hinaus", 22.02.2022, in <https://www.gtai.de/de/trade/israel/branchen/israels-raumfahrtindustrie-will-hoch-hinaus-959820>.
47. ELNET: "German Israeli Space Forum 2022", 10.06.2025, in <https://elnet-deutschland.de/themen/innovation/ginsum/german-israeli-space-forum-2022/>.
48. Broecker, Michael: "Dobrindt im Interview: „Warum Deutschland einen Cyberdome braucht und wie er mit der AfD umgehen will“, 29.06.2025, in <https://table.media/berlin/news/dobrindt-im-interview-warum-deutschland-einen-cyberdome-braucht-und-wie-er-mit-der-afd-umgehen-will>.
49. Krämer, Philip: "Sicherheit im Weltraum - Israel, Europa und die Verteidigung der Demokratie", ELNET Policy Briefings, European Leadership Network (ELNET), 15.09.2025, in <https://elnet-deutschland.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Policy-Briefing-Space-Defense.pdf>.
50. Europäische Sicherheit & Technik - ESUT: "Störsystem „Kalatron Attack“ erfolgreich gegen Flugabwehrradare", 28.11.2023, in <https://esut.de/2023/11/meldungen/45701/hensoldt-und-rafael-entwickeln-stoersystem-zum-schutz-von-marineschiffen/>.
51. Koalitionsvertrag CDU, CSU und SPD 2025: "Verantwortung für Deutschland - Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD - 21. Legislaturperiode", 05.05.2025, in <https://www.koalitionsvertrag2025.de/>.
52. Ovens, Carsten: "Ein neues Kapitel der Sicherheitspolitik", 28.03.2025, in <https://internationalepolitik.de/de/ein-neues-kapitel-der-sicherheitspolitik>.
53. Egozi, Arie: "Moderne Flugabwehr – Erhält der Iran S-400 aus Russland?", 30.07.2025, in <https://defence-network.com/moderne-flugabwehr-erhaelt-der-iran-s-400/>.
54. Ovens, Carsten: "Europa braucht Israel für die eigenen Verteidigung", 02.09.2025, in <https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/gastbeitraege/gastkommentar-europa-braucht-israel-fuer-die-eigene-verteidigung/100151204.html>.
55. Ovens, Carsten: "Deutsch-israelische Militärkooperation: Strategische Partnerschaft statt punktueller Zusammenarbeit", 09.07.2025, in <https://www.tagesspiegel.de/internationales/deutsch-israelische-militarkooperation-strategische-partnerschaft-statt-punktueller-zusammenarbeit-13940503.html>.
56. Ibid.