



EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP NETWORK

**ABRAHAM
ACCORDS**
INSTITUTE

FIVE YEARS OF THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS

Progress & Prospects



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Introduction

The Abraham Accords mark a historic turning point in the Middle East. With their signing in 2020, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and later Morocco and Sudan officially normalized relations with Israel, creating a new framework for cooperation which has been filled with life in many ways in recent years.

The effects of these agreements were clearly noticeable over the past five years. Economic cooperation has emerged in the fields of high-tech, renewable energies, medicine, agriculture, and tourism. Universities, research centers, and start-ups have begun to exchange knowledge and ideas. New avenues have also opened up on the societal level: students, businesspeople, and cultural figures have been able to officially establish contacts and build bridges where previously only political barriers existed.

It is almost forgotten today that Israeli diplomats were already promoting this idea in the 1990s, outlining a vision of a „New Middle East“ in which economic cooperation and normalization would replace hostility. What seemed utopian to many at the time took shape for the first time with the Abraham Accords. At the same time, however, they were a thorn in the side of extremists whose very existence is based on the hatred of Israel, such as the terrorist organization Hamas. The consequences of this hatred shook the entire world on October 7, 2023.

Despite the historic achievement of the agreements themselves, the challenges – and at the same time the poten-



tial – in the year of their fifth anniversary are greater than ever. Developments in the Hamas-Israel war in particular have a direct impact on their perception and implementation – including in Germany. While in 2023 around three-quarters of citizens favored a stronger role for the Federal Republic of Germany in the promotion of the agreements, according to a recent ELNET survey, only around half of Germans currently support this view. Nevertheless, the agreements continue to provide a stabilizing foundation and a central perspective for dialogue and cooperation in the Middle East.

The Israel Survey 2025 shows that a large majority of the European parliamentarians surveyed also remain committed to the opportunities offered by the Abraham process. 86 percent of participating Members of Parliament from 18 national parliaments are in favor of stronger European engagement in the context of the Abraham Accords.

It should not be forgotten that Europe benefits greatly from stability in the region. The security policy dimension of the Abraham Accords is shaped by current threats, which have increased in recent years. Iran, in particular, as a declared enemy of Israel and rival of many Arab states, is at the center of this dynamic. Its support for radical militias, its nuclear program, and its

growing proximity to Russia have triggered deep mistrust among numerous states in the Middle East. Against this backdrop, the Abraham Accords offer opportunities not only in economic terms, but also in terms of security co-operation. The result could be nothing less than a new security alliance in the Middle East protecting the region from destabilization and ultimately bringing additional security and stability to Europe.¹ Europe must therefore not stand on the sidelines when it comes to developments in the

Middle East. The fifth anniversary of the Abraham Accords offers a special opportunity for Europe to make its mark. This could include promoting the institutionalization of the normalization process, for example by establishing a tri-lateral Abraham Accords Secretariat, which could open offices in Abu Dhabi, Brussels, and Jerusalem. Such a central coordination office should deepen dialogue, initiate joint projects, and strengthen regional cooperation in the long term. It could also promote the involvement of new partners,

including the Palestinians. Europe would thus not only recognize the importance of the Abraham Accords, but also actively assume responsibility for their future development and expansion.

Carsten Ovens

CARSTEN OVENS

CEO ELNET (DACH)



Zur deutschen
Version

Should Germany actively promote closer cooperation between Israel and other countries in the Arab region (e.g., like the agreements with the UAE and Bahrain)?




Table of Contents

Introduction / Table of Contents	1 - 3	Climate and Energy	10 - 12
Foreword	4	Security and Defense	12 - 15
Civil Society Exchange	5 - 7	Outlook	16
Economy and Trade	7 - 9	Bibliography	17 - 19

Foreword

The Abraham Accords are among the most significant diplomatic achievements of recent decades. They open up a new vision for peace, prosperity, and cooperation in the Middle East.

On September 15, 2020, the United States, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain—later followed by Morocco and Sudan—decided to overcome outdated paradigms of division and embark on a path of dialogue and joint progress. This created new political and social spaces for action. A spirit of warm peace emerged, in which governments, businesses, academia, and civil society were able to forge lasting connections.

The past five years have shown that this vision is bearing fruit: trade volumes increased, cooperation in technology and innovation expanded, and collaboration in security and defense deepened. Areas like health, energy, and environmental protection also recorded progress. In addition, interfaith dialogue, tolerance, and coexistence in the region took on a new radiance.

However, this progress has also met resistance. With the terrorist attacks of October 7, the radical Islamist Hamas struck at the very heart of the Abraham Accords: By means of violence and hatred, they sought to crush the nascent seed of peace in the bud. The resulting conflicts, the Hamas-Israel war, and the immense human suffering have put the accords to a serious test.



ARMIN LASCHET MdB

Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag and Founder of the Abraham Accords Institute Germany



Despite these challenges, the Abraham Accords remain in place today. Behind the scenes, they are making an important contribution to gradually returning the region to a path of peaceful coexistence.

Two key tasks must be pursued in the future: First, to consolidate and deepen existing partnerships. Second, to extend the circle of peace to other countries. With leadership, determination, and mutual respect, the Abraham Accords can continue to be a cornerstone of stability, prosperity, and peace in the Middle East.

Civil Society Exchange

TOURISM

Since the founding of the State of Israel, travel from Israel to neighboring Arab countries has been complicated and often unthinkable. Due to a lack of contact, it has been virtually impossible to break down prejudices, fears, and resentments through personal encounters. With the Abraham Accords coming into force in 2020, Israelis can now travel to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) without a visa. Overall, tourism between Israel and its partners has grown significantly since then.

In 2022, around 5,200 visitors from the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan traveled to Israel (2019: 3,500),

while at the same time 470,700 Israeli tourists visited these countries – a remarkable increase compared to 39,900 visitors before the agreements. This underscores the significantly greater interest of Israeli travelers in the Arab Abraham Accords countries.²

While almost all international airlines had at various times suspended flights to Israel since October 7, 2023, UAE airlines continued to fly to Tel Aviv several times a day. In light of the significant increase in Israeli tourists to the UAE, a high-speed train connection between Dubai and Abu Dhabi is now planned, which should make travel significantly faster and more convenient for Israelis.³

Entry into Morocco is also possible under simplified conditions, for example via an eVisa. Oman, although not yet a signatory to the agreements, has allowed Israeli airlines to use its airspace since 2023, following Saudi Arabia's example from 2022.^{4/5/6}

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND RESEARCH

The initial phase of the Abraham Accords was primarily characterized by new collaborations in the field of university research. This has resulted in numerous examples of cooperation in science and technology:


For example, the Israeli organization Startup Nation Central (SNC), together with Moroccan and Bahraini partners, held bilateral „Connect to Innovate“ conferences in Manama and Marrakesh, as well as a regional conference focusing on female leadership.

With the T3 program, the UAE-IL Tech Zone has created a platform that brings together young professionals from Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the US, promoting a strong network for technological exchange. This commitment is complemented by initiatives such as the UAE-Israel Business Council and DANA Global, which promote cooperation between startups, investors, and research institutions.

At the same time, Emirati institutions such as ADGM and Hub71, together with the Israeli Embassy in Abu Dhabi and

partners from the private sector, have developed programs that specifically support innovation in the high-tech sector.⁷ The intensified cooperation between the Abraham Accords countries also extends to the medical sector. Israel's largest hospital, Sheba Medical Center, and the Emirati healthcare network PureHealth have been working together since June 2023 to advance clinical research projects, digital medical technologies, and training programs for medical personnel.⁸

Educational and research cooperation between the countries of the Abraham Accords




INTERFAITH EXCHANGE

The establishment of diplomatic relations has also led to a new dialogue between the religions of the region. A remarkable example of this new tolerance is the extraordinary Abrahamic Family House in Abu Dhabi. Opened in 2023, it consists of a church, a synagogue, a mosque, and a cultural center for believers of all Abrahamic religions.¹⁴

In addition, travel restrictions have been eased as a result of the agreements, making the holy sites in Jerusalem more accessible to Muslim citizens of the UAE, Sudan, Bahrain, and Morocco.

Triggered by the signing of the Abraham Accords, initiatives such as „Sharaka“ have also developed, promoting education and exchange programs for understanding, cooperation, and peace in the region. Holocaust and tolerance education programs teach young people from the Abraham Accords signatories historical knowledge and civic responsibility through workshops, meetings with experts, and visits to Israel, which offer a profound examination of the





Shoah and its lessons for the present. In addition, a network of teachers from the Abraham Accords countries and the US jointly develops teaching materials and promotes cultural exchange.¹⁵

It is noteworthy that in January 2023, the UAE became the first Arab country to integrate the Holocaust as an integral part of school education.¹⁶ This is a notable and important initiative, considering that denial and distortion of the Holocaust remain prevalent in the Arab world to this day.¹⁷

Economy and Trade


The Jewish community in the British Mandate of Palestine (Yishuv) was subject to a trade boycott by the Arab League in 1945. This boycott was transferred to Israel when it was founded and remained in place for decades until several states eased their restrictions in the wake of the Abraham Accords or, like the UAE, abolished them completely in 2020. With the establishment of diplomatic relations under the agreements, trade volumes between the signatory states increased significantly.

The Abraham Accords now open up opportunities for new trade routes. Morocco's geographical proximity to Europe and the port of Jebel Ali in the UAE, a central hub of the Arabian Peninsula for trade with India and China, are of particular strategic importance.

ISRAEL AND THE UAE

Israel and the UAE both see themselves as tech pioneers: Israel is an international leader in artificial intelligence, blockchain, cybersecurity, and quantum computing. The United Arab Emirates also invest heavily in future technologies to make its economy less dependent on oil in the long term. The UAE have also established themselves as a pioneer in digital transformation, smart city development, and large-scale energy projects. These complementary strengths create great potential for new partnerships.

Total trade volume between Israel and the Abraham Accords countries



Source: Ghuloom, Mahdi: "Assessing Trade within the Abraham Accords", 27.05.2025

Although the UAE publicly criticized Israel's military operation in the Gaza Strip, it continues to maintain diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. Emirati institutions have continued their exchanges with Israeli partners, although key projects – such as the joint development of the largest Israeli offshore natural gas field by Abu Dhabi's ADNOC, BP, and Israel's NewMed Energy – has been put on hold for the time being.¹⁸

Of the signatory states to the Abraham Accords, the UAE has established itself as Israel's most committed economic partner. The partnership between the

BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

INFO

Free Trade Agreement

In 2022, Israel and the UAE signed the CEPA agreement, which eliminates 96 percent of all tariffs and is expected to increase trade to 10 billion USD by 2027.¹⁹

Access to the European gas market

In 2021, Mubadala Petroleum from Abu Dhabi acquired a 22 percent stake in Israel's Tamar gas field for 1 billion USD. This is a strategic investment for the UAE, providing direct access to the European gas market.²⁰

which shares many characteristics of a comprehensive free trade agreement.

Between 2021 and 2024, Israel recorded trade deficits with the UAE, Morocco, and Bahrain. However, the Abraham Accords countries as a whole recorded a net profit, particularly the UAE. The UAE made targeted use of normalization to achieve a significant cumulative trade surplus while broadening its economic partnerships. Between 2021 and 2024, the total bilateral trade volume between Israel and the UAE reached USD 6.4 billion.²¹

While Israel's total trade declined by 18 percent since October 7, 2023, trade volume with the Abraham Accords states fell by only 4 percent. Given the serious impact that October 7 had on Israel worldwide, this can be considered a success.²²

two countries is characterized by the largest number of bilateral agreements, including the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA),

de volume with the Abraham Accords states fell by only 4 percent. Given the serious impact that October 7 had on Israel worldwide, this can be considered a success.²²

ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO AND BAHRAIN

Although the Hamas-Israel war led to a decline in Israeli tourists traveling to Morocco, other dimensions of bilateral relations remain intact. For example, Israel replaced imports from Turkey with vehicles from Morocco in the automotive sector.²³

Compared to the economic ties with the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco's economic relations with Israel remain limited, mainly due to domestic political sensitivities, low structural complementarity, and the lack of formal trade agreements.²⁴

Between 2021 and 2024, bilateral trade in goods amounted to around USD 576 million in the case of Morocco and only USD 50 million in the case of Bahrain.

During this period, Israel had a cumulative trade deficit with all signatory states of the Abraham Accords, importing more on average than it exported. However, Bahrain was unable to achieve any significant trade gains. The low volumes and lack of structural complementarity with Israeli demand point to an econo-

mic relationship that has been primarily symbolic in nature so far.²⁵ Nevertheless, trade with Morocco and Bahrain increased noticeably in 2024, despite temporary threats by Bahrain to sever economic ties.²⁶

Before October 7, Bahrain signaled an explicit interest in an economically oriented partnership with Israel. The resulting draft free trade agreement has been well advanced since 2022, but final ratification is still pending. The signing of a memorandum of

understanding was planned for 2023, but has yet to materialize.²⁷

This shows that the economic potential of normaliza-

tion does not depend solely on political continuity, but requires targeted measures and tailored strategies to close structural trade gaps and strengthen complementarity

between the partners. This is the only way to ensure that normalization translates into concrete economic returns for all signatory states.



Major trade routes and the role of the signatory states of the Abraham Accords

Source: The Abraham Accords Peace Institute 2022

Climate and Energy

Global warming is impacting the Middle East at more than twice the global average rate.²⁸ Cross-border cooperation is crucial for implementing effective mitigation and adaptation measures. Israel has been participating in regional climate meetings alongside Arab states, such as COP27 in Egypt for years. Initiatives from Israel's poli-

tical leadership, such as the plan for a „Renewable Middle East“ presented by President Isaac Herzog in early 2023, or approaches developed by civil society, such as the NGO MENA2050, which has established a climate committee to address common challenges, illustrate the desire and opportunities for regional cooperation on climate protection.²⁹

THE MENA REGION AND THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF SOLAR ENERGY

In the MENA region, solar energy has the greatest potential among renewable energy sources. Despite the immense wealth of resources, this potential remains largely untapped: while the solar resources of the Sahara alone could theoretically provide for an installed capacity of over 1,000,000 gigawatts, the combined solar capacity of the entire region in 2022 amounted to only 16 gigawatts. By way of comparison, this is roughly equivalent to the installed solar capacity of France, which relies primarily on nuclear energy.³⁰ The main reasons for this are the substantial initial investments necessary, which are lacking so far, insufficient grid and storage infrastructure, political uncertainties, as well as specific climatic challenges that need to be overcome.³¹

The further expansion of green energy ecosystems will

be crucial for the patterns of cooperation between the sub-regions of North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the eastern Mediterranean in the future.³² Morocco, Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel are driving this process forward by linking large-scale renewable energy infrastructure with the development of diverse markets, as well as storage and transportation solutions.³³

One example of the intensified cooperation following the Abraham Accords is the strategic partnership between Masdar from the UAE and EDF Renewables Israel. In 2021, the two companies signed an agreement to jointly operate existing solar and wind farms in Israel and to develop further renewable energy projects together.³⁴

With projects such as the Sakaka Solar Plant and Sudair Solar PV, Saudi Arabia is investing in solar power plants that are particularly efficient thanks to the use of state-of-

the-art technologies. Beyond pure electricity production, storage solutions are also being developed, such as at the Dumat Al-Jandal CSP plant, which stores energy for times when the sun is not out. The NEOM Green Hydrogen Project is also noteworthy. It uses solar power to produce green hydrogen and ammonia, which are also intended for international energy trading. This not only creates local sources of electricity, but also new export markets and transport routes for renewable energy sources. By establishing its own production chain for solar technologies and integrating smart grids, Saudi Arabia is demonstrating how renewable energies can be systematically linked to markets, storage, and infrastructure—a step toward a comprehensive, sustainable energy ecosystem.³⁵

Although Saudi Arabia is not yet a signatory to the agreements, the rapprochement between the kingdom and Israel has been significantly

influenced by the Abraham Accords in recent years. The overall outlook for renewable

energy supply chains based in the MENA region is therefore promising and closely

linked to the rapprochement brought about by the Abraham Accords.³⁶

WATER-ENERGY NEXUS DEAL

The Water-Energy Nexus Deal (Green-Blue Deal) signed in Dubai in 2021 between Israel, Jordan, and the UAE sets out that Jordan will supply solar power and Israel will supply desalinated water in return. The initiative, developed by EcoPeace, aims to ensure a sustainable water and energy supply and was facilitated by the mediation of the UAE. The project is to be financed and implemented by Masdar, a UAE state-owned renewable energy company.^{37/38}

The initiative came to a standstill following Hamas' attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 as Jordan and Israel have frozen the deal. Nevertheless, the structural necessity remains: Jordan's acute water shortage is worsening, while Israel is dependent on additional renewable energy sources. The economic logic also remains viable, as desalinated water and solar power are comparatively cost-effective solutions to the problem. Looking ahead to the post-war phase, reconstruction in Gaza could create new pressure to advance regional climate and resource-oriented cooperation. Despite significant setbacks, the project remains a reference model for integrated climate, energy, and peace initiatives in the Middle East.³⁹



ISRAEL AND MOROCCO

Since 2020, Israel and Morocco have been intensifying their cooperation in the environmental and climate sectors. Morocco is increasingly using Israeli technologies in the water and wind energy sectors.⁴⁰ In addition, both countries signed an energy agreement on the production of green hydrogen at COP27 in 2022.⁴¹

ISRAEL AND THE UAE

As pioneers in green tech, Israel and the UAE have been cooperating on climate and clean energy since 2020. Israel is contributing its expertise in water technologies and food security in particular.

In January 2025, the Israeli government approved a memorandum of understanding with the United Arab Emirates to expand bilateral energy cooperation. The agreement covers key areas for the future, including renewable energy, hydrogen, natural gas, clean fuels, energy storage,

cybersecurity, electricity trading, and research and development.

Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen emphasized the strategic dimension: Israel could act as a „regional bridge corridor“ between Europe and the Gulf states. Implementation is to take place through joint research and development projects, expert exchanges, seminars, and corporate cooperation. The aim is to promote both economic stability and regional prosperity.

The agreement builds on existing investments: the Emirati sovereign wealth fund Mubadala Petroleum had already acquired 22 percent of the Israeli gas fields Tamar and Dalit for around USD 1 billion in 2021 and is also involved in Egyptian gas fields.⁴²

Projects such as the Water-Energy Nexus Deal should be further developed despite political setbacks. The shared use of solar resources and water technologies can become a driver of regional stability.

Security and Defense

DEFENSE COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Israel has become one of the largest arms exporters in recent years. Israeli exports in this sector reached a volume of USD 14.79 billion in 2024 – a new record and an increase of 13 percent over the previous year. European countries were among the main recipients, purchasing 54 percent of Israeli arms, compared to 35 percent in 2023. Europe was followed by Asia and the Pacific region at 23 percent and the Abraham Accords countries at 12 percent.⁴³ This represents a significant decline in arms exports to Abraham Accords countries, which still accounted for approximately 25 percent in 2022.

Nevertheless, the Abraham Accords have largely survived the Hamas-Israel war, even in the field of security

policy. Against the backdrop of the ongoing US withdrawal from parts of the Middle East, local alliances such as those between Israel, the UAE, and potentially Saudi Arabia are gaining in importance—both regionally and internationally.⁴⁴

Even before October 7, there were signs of a strategic rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which was seen as a potential milestone for regional integration and a possible expansion of the Abraham Accords. However, the escalation of the Hamas-Israel war abruptly interrupted this process and brought the rapprochement to a standstill.⁴⁵

Despite this, in the spring of 2025, several Arab states (including Saudi Arabia) participated in repelling Iranian attacks on Israel, prompting Prime Minister

Benjamin Netanyahu to call for a security-oriented “Abraham Alliance.” The first steps in this direction were already initiated by the Middle East Air Defense Alliance (MEAD) in 2022. At the same time, military developments since October 2023, the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the fall of the Syrian regime

have exposed Iran’s vulnerabilities and prompted Tehran to adopt a more cooperative stance toward its Arab neighbors. Against this backdrop, Iran presented its own model of regional defense cooperation, which includes Turkey but explicitly excludes Israel.⁴⁶

ISRAEL AND THE UAE

The joint development of an unmanned naval vessel by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), EDGE, and Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB) marked a milestone in defense cooperation. The system, unveiled at IDEX 2023, is equipped with sensors, sonar, and imaging technologies and has a remote command and control system that can operate entirely

without human intervention. This cooperation not only highlights the technical capabilities of the partners, but also underscores the strategic dimension of deeper military-technological cooperation and maritime defense cooperation between Israel and the United Arab Emirates.⁴⁷

In 2021, the first major maritime exercise involving the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Israel, and the

US took place in the Red Sea, coordinated by the US Navy. The exercise focused on boarding, search, and seizure tactics to secure key shipping lanes, with the overall goal of strengthening the interoperability of the participating armed forces against the background of the ongoing threat posed by Iran. The Islamic Republic is involved in low-level maritime conflicts with Israel, including attacks on tankers and drone attacks.⁴⁸



INFO

MIDDLE EAST AIR DEFENSE ALLIANCE (MEAD)

In June 2022, Israel announced its accession to a new regional air defense network initiated by the US, the Middle East Air Defense Alliance (MEAD). With this announcement, then-Defense Minister Benny Gantz emphasized that Israel would link its air defense capabilities more closely with partners in the Middle East – including countries previously considered adversaries. A particular focus is being placed on the possible participation of Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.⁴⁹

Israel’s changed role as a result of the Abraham Accords is also reflected in the shift from the European Command (EUCOM) to the Central Command (CENTCOM), one of the United States’ geographic regional commands. Its area of responsibility includes, among other things, the trade routes through the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz.⁵⁰

ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA

According to media reports, Saudi Arabia has contacted Israel about the possible purchase of Israeli air defense systems—at a time when the US began withdrawing its systems previously stationed in the Saudi kingdom. According to regional observers, low-level talks between Riyadh and Jerusalem have been ongoing for years, but these have gained considerable momentum since the withdrawal of US systems

became known. Although Saudi Arabia is not yet part of the Abraham Accords, government officials emphasize that the two countries have been exchanging security-related information for some time, even without formal diplomatic relations.⁵¹ Saudi Arabia's military support for Israel during the Iranian attacks on Israel in June 2025 also underscores the kingdom's special security partnership with Israel – even without formalization through the Abraham Accords.

ISRAEL, MOROCCO, AND BAHRAIN

In January 2023, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces announced that they would further deepen cooperation with Israel and extend it to additional areas such as intelligence, air defense, and electronic warfare. The announcement followed the first meeting of the Monitoring Committee for Moroccan-Israeli Defense Cooperation in Rabat and underscores the importance of institutionalizing the deepening of bilateral security relations.⁵²

Paradoxically, the Hamas-Israel war has deepened relations between Morocco and

Israel. While Rabat struck a more critical tone in its public communications in order to appease domestic sentiment—for example, by calling for a ceasefire and a two-state solution early on — bilateral cooperation in the economic and security spheres increased significantly.

In the defense sector, Morocco is about to acquire a reconnaissance satellite from Israel Aerospace Industries worth USD 1 billion. At the same time, trade cooperation intensified, with exports rising to USD 53.2 million in the first six months of 2024 (+64 percent compared to the previous year). Despite public

criticism of the intensification of relations, behind the scenes there is a growing security partnership with Morocco and Bahrain, driven by a shared perception of Iran as a threat and a vision of regional integration.⁵³

In 2022, Bahrain became the first member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to sign an official security agreement with Israel. This step is particularly relevant as the GCC is one of the most important organizations in the Arab world for both economic cooperation and military collaboration.⁵⁴

CYBERSECURITY

Close cooperation in the cyber domain has developed between Israel and the UAE. One of the most striking signs of this cooperation is the development of a multinational cyber cooperation platform led by Microsoft Israel, the Israeli National Cyber Directorate, and the UAE Cyber Council.

In May 2024, the Cyber Security Council (CSC) of the United Arab Emirates and the Israeli National Cyber Directorate (INCD) presented the Crystal Ball




Image: Mohammad Rahmani / Unsplash

threat intelligence platform, supported by Microsoft Israel, at the RSA Conference in San Francisco. As the first multilateral platform of its kind, it enables the rapid exchange of threat information, joint attribution of attacks, and thus the strengthening of international cyber defense. To date, over 35 incidents have been shared, including 19 contributions from the UAE, such as the Lockbit ransomware attack on a local company and the APT42 campaign against institutions in the Middle East. Developed as part of the International Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI) Information Sharing Committee, the platform is considered a mi-


lestone in high-quality cooperation and is intended to deter cybercriminals from further attacks through increased transparency and deterrence. At the summit, the heads of the UAE and Israel's national cybersecurity agencies called on CRI members to actively contribute, share information, and play a role in the design, integration, governance, and oversight of the platform.⁵⁵

Joint platforms such as the Crystal Ball Initiative and MEAD strengthen resilience against common threats (Iran, terrorism, cyberattacks).

Israeli defense exports by region

Source: Israeli Ministry of Defense

Israel ranks eighth among the world's top ten arms exporters. In the years 2020-2024, Israeli companies had a market share of approximately 3.1 percent.⁵⁶



Outlook

Five years after their signing, the Abraham Accords have developed remarkable momentum: tourism, scientific exchange, interfaith dialogue, and economic cooperation have visibly increased. The United Arab Emirates in particular has established itself as a key partner for Israel, while relations with Bahrain and Morocco continue to be marked by some structural hurdles and political sensitivities.

Despite the challenges posed by the Hamas-Israel war, the agreements have remained in place – an indication of their strategic added value for all signatory states.

At the same time, limitations are becoming apparent: economic success is unevenly distributed, co-operation in the climate and energy sectors is fragile, and progress on security policy depends heavily on regional dynamics. The agreements have laid the foundation for trust and cooperation, but in order to remain stable and resilient in the long term, targeted political steering and deeper institutional structures are needed.


If the dialogue goes beyond short-term interests and concrete benefits for all signatory states and their societies become visible, the

agreements can serve as a long-term foundation for peace and co-operation and also generate more support and acceptance among the respective populations. This also applies to the integration of the Palestinian territories, especially for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip.

The Abraham Accords have changed the political map of the Middle East. Whether the successes achieved so far can be translated into sustainable economic, social, and security structures, will determine their future.

86 percent

of the surveyed European parliamentarians from 18 European parliaments support stronger engagement by their country in agreements between Israel and Arab states.



My country should actively support the conclusion of additional agreements between Israel and Arab or Muslim countries.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neutral
- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree

Survey among 1,061 members of parliament conducted between 2022 and 2025

Source: ELNET Israel Survey

Further information on the ELNET Survey



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The **Abraham Accords Institute for Peace and Regional Integration** is committed to the vision of regional cooperation based on coexistence and dialogue. It builds on the historic opportunity created by the Abraham Accords for lasting Arab–Israeli rapprochement and supports the Abraham process through cooperation projects in Germany and across the region.

Imprint

Publisher:

ELNET Deutschland e. V.
www.elnet-deutschland.de

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Design:

Alter.berlin Medienberatung

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